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Abstract We consider a principal-agent setting in which a manager’s compensation
depends on a noisy performance signal, and the manager is granted the right to choose
an (accounting) method to determine the value of the performance signal. We study the
effect of the degree of such reporting discretion, measured by the number of acceptable
methods, on the optimal contract, the expected cost of compensation, and the man-
ager’s expected utility. We find that a minimal degree of discretion may be necessary
for successful contracting. We also find that while an increase in reporting discretion
never harms the manager, the effect on the expected cost of compensation is more sub-
tle. We identify three main effects of increased reporting discretion and characterize
the conditions under which the aggregate of these three effects will lead to a higher or
lower cost of compensation. Finally, we find that when reporting discretion induces
costly effort on the part of the manager, the optimal degree of discretion can be higher
than when it is costless.
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1 Introduction
We consider a principal who contracts with a risk- and effort-averse manager in
order to motivate him to deliver the desired effort level. Since the effort provided
by the manager is not directly observable, the principal contracts on the basis of a
noisy signal, e.g. based on accounting numbers. Accounting standards such as Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles, however, usually offer a variety of acceptable
accounting methods (e.g., LIFO vs. FIFO, accelerated vs straight line depreciation,
etc.). It has been demonstrated in several settings that it may be optimal to grant a
manager the discretion to choose an accounting method, even when his compensa-
tion depends on performance measures derived from reported accounting numbers.
Demski et al. (1984) show that when accounting method choice is verifiable, dele-
gating the choice to the manager may be optimal because by motivating the manager
to use a different accounting method for different realizations of his private informa-
tion, the manager’s information rent is reduced. Verrecchia (1986) considers a setting
where accounting method choice is partially unverifiable, and shows that even when
the principal has the option to implicitly eliminate reporting flexibility by affecting
the attractiveness of the acceptable reporting alternatives, it is in general not optimal
to do so. Ozbilgin and Penno (2008) consider a principal-agent model with a set of
ex-ante equivalent performance measurement methods, and find that delegating the
choice of measurement method to the manager is optimal if he is sufficiently risk
averse.
Given these various conditions under which delegating accounting method choice
(or, more generally, performance measurement method) to the manager is optimal, and
given the ongoing debate on the “desired” degree of flexibility in GAAP, it is relevant
and important to investigate the effect of the degree of reporting flexibility on the
internal agency problem. Prior literature shows that risk aversion plays a crucial role
in understanding the effect of increased reporting flexibility on the expected cost of
compensation. Demski (1998) considers a multi-period model where the manager has
private information and can manipulate earnings numbers. He shows that the expected
cost of compensation when the manager is motivated to manipulate earnings numbers
can be lower than in a situation where he has no private information, so that results can
only be reported truthfully. The underlying reason is that the manager can only manip-
ulate the performance signal in case the desirable effort level is delivered, and allowing
for manipulation reduces the manager’s risk. Ozbilgin and Penno (2008) show that
when the manager has the discretion to choose the performance measurement method,
increased reporting flexibility (as measured by the number of acceptable performance
measurement methods) decreases the expected cost of compensation if the manager
is sufficiently risk averse. Their setting has no information asymmetry other than
the manager’s action and measurement choices. These results show that more report-
ing flexibility for the manager, either through diversity in acceptable measurement
methods (as in Ozbilgin and Penno 2008) or through allowed earnings manipulation
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(as in Demski 1998) can be beneficial to the principal since it reduces the manager’s
compensation risk.1
In this paper we take a principal-agent approach similar to Ozbilgin and Penno
(2008), in which the manager’s compensation depends on a noisy performance signal,
and the manager is granted the right to choose an (accounting) method to determine
the value of the performance signal. We study the effect of the degree of reporting flex-
ibility, measured by the number of acceptable measurement methods, on the expected
cost of compensation and on the manager’s expected utility.2 Our results complement
and extend theirs in several directions. First, we show that a minimal level of reporting
flexibility may be necessary for the existence of an optimal contract, i.e., if incentive
problems cannot be resolved at finite cost, an increase in the degree of reporting flex-
ibility can be sufficient to solve this problem. Specifically, when the principal faces a
hard agency problem because an unfavorable signal carries little information regarding
the manager’s action choice, and because the level of utility that the manager derives
from compensation cannot be made arbitrarily high by increasing the level of the bonus
in case of a favorable signal, it is impossible to design a contract that motivates the
manager to deliver high effort. Increasing the degree of reporting flexibility mitigates
this problem because it increases the informativeness of an unfavorable signal. Thus,
if a manager cannot be motivated to deliver high effort by increasing the level of the
bonus, increasing the level of reporting discretion may be an alternative means to
resolve incentive conflicts.
Second, whether the limited liability constraint is binding in our setting is endog-
enous and depends on the degree of reporting flexibility. We distinguish two critical
values of the degree of reporting flexibility. The first critical value determines whether
the manager will earn a limited liability rent. The second critical value determines
whether increased reporting flexibility makes it easier or more difficult to prevent
shirking, i.e., whether a higher bonus is required to motivate high effort. As long as
the degree of flexibility does not exceed either of these two critical values, higher
reporting flexibility yields a lower expected cost of compensation, even though it does
not affect the manager’s expected utility. Above the two threshold values, increased
reporting flexibility is strictly beneficial to the manager, but harmful to the principal.
For intermediate degrees of reporting flexibility, the effect is ambiguous. We show that
increased reporting flexibility may then be socially optimal in the sense that it makes
both the principal and the manager strictly better off.
Third, determining performance signals from multiple measurement methods may
require costly effort on the part of the manager. We investigate the effect of such flexi-
bility induced costly reporting effort on the expected compensation cost. We find that,
compared to the case where reporting effort is costless, offering reporting flexibility
may be more attractive, i.e., the optimal degree of reporting flexibility can be higher,
when flexibility induces costs. Moreover, for sufficiently large degrees of reporting
1 Penno (2005) considers a manager who can choose between N performance measurement signals that
are i.i.d. exponentially distributed, and shows that the expected cost of compensation is independent of N .
This remarkable result is due to the nature of the exponential distribution.
2 Ozbilgin and Penno (2008) distinguishes settings in which the discretion to choose the method rests with
the principal and settings where it rests with the manager. The focus in our paper is on the latter.
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flexibility, the expected cost of compensation can be strictly lower when reporting
induces costly effort, than when it is costless. This occurs for two reasons. When
reporting costs are not too high, the manager will, in expectation, engage in more
costly reporting effort when low effort was delivered than when high effort was deliv-
ered. Thus, costly effort associated with determining performance signals makes low
effort relatively less attractive, so that it becomes easier to motivate the manager to
deliver high effort. Second, when the degree of reporting flexibility is sufficiently high,
compensation for costly reporting effort may lead to a reduction in the limited liability
rent. The combination of these two effects implies that higher degrees of flexibility
can be more attractive when flexibility induces costly reporting effort, than when it is
costless.
Although related, the problem studied in this paper differs in several ways from the
literature on equilibrium earnings management when the Revelation Principle fails to
hold due to, e.g., restricted communication, lack of commitment, or contracting restric-
tions. There, the focus is on settings where the manager has private information and
may be able to manage earnings in a way that would not be accepted if detected by an
audit system. The issue is then whether motivating rejection of earnings management
is optimal. It has been demonstrated that allowing for, and motivating, manipulation of
performance measures may be beneficial to the principal in situations where manip-
ulation requires costly effort Demski et al. (2004), Liang (2004) or when there is
limited commitment Arya et al. (1998). In our setting, there is no private information
(other than the action and measurement method choice) and all available measure-
ment methods are equally acceptable. The issue is therefore not whether the manager
should be motivated to choose a particular method. Rather, the focus is on the effect
of diversity in measurement methods on the expected cost of compensation, given that
the manager can strategically choose any method from the set of acceptable methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the model.
In Sect. 3 we derive the optimal contract conditional on the number of acceptable
accounting methods. In Sect. 4 we study the effect of increased reporting flexibility on
the optimal contract, the expected cost of compensation, and the manager’s expected
utility. Section 5 discusses the implications of reporting flexibility for both the princi-
pal and the manager. Section 6 investigates the effect of costs associated with reporting
flexibility. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a principal who contracts with a risk- and effort-averse manager in order
to motivate him to deliver the desired effort level. Since the effort provided by the man-
ager is not directly observable, the principal contracts on the basis of a noisy signal.
The model is similar to the models in Ozbilgin and Penno (2008), Penno (2005). Spe-
cifically, there is managerial reporting flexibility in the sense that there are a number
of different noisy performance signals, each resulting from equally acceptable mea-
surement methods. Our focus is on the case where the choice of accounting method is
delegated to the manager, i.e., the manager has the discretion to choose a measurement
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method, and report only the corresponding signal to the principal.3 The choice occurs
ex post, i.e., after all the signals have been realized.
There are two effort levels a ∈ {aH , aL}, and a set of N equally acceptable mea-
surement methods. Each method yields a signal that can take two values y ∈ {yH , yL},
with yH > yL . The signals resulting from the N different measurement methods are
independent and identically distributed random variables yi , i = 1, . . . , N , for which
the probability distribution is determined by the action chosen by the manager in the
following way:
P{yi = yH |a = aH } = 1 − p,
P{yi = yL |a = aH } = p,
(1)
P{yi = yH |a = aL} = 1 − q,
P{yi = yL |a = aL} = q.
(2)
Without loss of generality we assume that 0 < p < q < 1, i.e. the probability of
outcome yL is higher under aL than under aH . This implies that the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property (MLRP) holds, i.e., if aH is the desirable action, yH is a “good”
signal, and yL is a “bad” signal.
The principal is risk neutral; the manager is a risk- and effort-averse expected utility
maximizer. His utility depends on the level of compensation x , and the effort level a,
and is given by:
u(x, a) = −e−ρ(x−c(a)), for x ∈ R, and a ∈ {aL , aH }, (3)
where ρ > 0 represents the degree of risk aversion, and c(a) represents the monetary
equivalent of the disutility associated with effort level a (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart
1983). Because the manager is effort-averse, we let cH = c(aH ) > cL = c(aL).
The timeline is as follows:
– Date 0: The principal specifies the level of discretion N , and the levels of com-
pensation that will be paid to the manager in case yH , respectively yL , is reported.
The manager decides to accept or reject the contract. If the manager accepts the
contract, he then chooses his effort level a ∈ {aH , aL}.
– Date 1: The manager determines the value yi ∈ {yH , yL} of the signal resulting
from the i th acceptable performance measurement method, for i = 1, . . . , N , and
reports one signal ŷ ∈ {yi ; i = 1, . . . , N } to the principal. Compensation is paid
and the game ends.
3 Alternatively, the principal could require the manager to report all N signals instead of only one. As
argued in Ozbilgin and Penno (2008), Penno (2005), however, reported performance signals are typically
not uncontestable until they are subjected to a costly verification process. Therefore, while requiring the
manager to report all signals instead of just one would give the principal the option to use more than
one performance signal, it would also increase the cost to the principal associated with verifying reported
signals.
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Without loss of generality, we focus on the compensation scheme needed to motivate
the manager to take action aH .4 Then, similarly to (Arya et al. 1992; Dye and Magee
1991; Ozbilgin and Penno 2008), the principal needs to minimize the expected cost of
inducing the agent to choose action aH , taking into account his self-interested behav-
ior with respect to his action and reporting choices. Specifically, for any given level
of reporting flexibility N , the principal determines the corresponding compensation
levels such that the expected cost of compensation is minimized, under the constraints
that: i) the manager reports the most favorable signal (i.e., the one that maximizes his
compensation) among the set of N acceptable signals yi , i = 1, . . . ,N , ii) providing
high effort yields a higher expected utility than providing low effort (incentive com-
patibility), iii) staying with the firm and accepting the contract is preferable to the first
best alternative (individual rationality), and, iv) compensation is nonnegative (limited
liability).5
Let us denote s(y, N ) for the compensation received in case N measurement meth-
ods are available, and signal y is reported. Moreover, let M denote the manager’s
reservation utility. Then, for any given level of reporting flexibility N , the following
optimization problem needs to be solved:
min E [ s(ŷ, N )| a = aH ]
s.t.
ŷ ∈ arg max
y∈{y1,...,yN }
s(y, N )
E [u(s(ŷ, N ), a)| a = aH ]  M
E [u(s(ŷ, N ), a)| a = aH ]  E [u(s(ŷ, N ), a)| a = aL ]
s(yH , N )  0, s(yL , N )  0
(4)
It now remains to specify how the probability distribution of the reported signal ŷ
depends on the degree of reporting flexibility N , and the action choice a. Clearly,
s(yH , N )  s(yL , N ) ⇒ ŷ = max{yi ; i = 1, . . . , N }, (5)
s(yH , N )  s(yL , N ) ⇒ ŷ = min{yi ; i = 1, . . . , N }. (6)
It is easy to verify that due to the MLRP, the optimal contract when ŷ = min{yi ; i =
1, . . . , N } satisfies s(yH , N ) > s(yL , N ). Therefore, ŷ = max{yi ; i = 1, . . . ,N },
i.e., the reported signal ŷ equals yH if for at least one measurement method it
holds that yi = yH , and equals yL otherwise. Consequently, as in Ozbilgin and
Penno (2008), Penno (2005), the probability distribution of the reported signal under
high effort depends on the number of acceptable measurement alternatives in the
4 It is easily verified that, for all N , the cost minimizing compensation scheme that motivates the manager
to take action aL when N methods are available consists of a flat wage of M + cL .
5 As argued in Lewis (1980), the penalties that the principal may impose on the manager are typically
limited by bankruptcy and/or legal liability laws. While limited liability is sometimes interpreted as an
(imperfect) substitute for risk aversion, ignoring either risk aversion or limited liability may significantly
affect the second best solution (see, e.g., Holmström 1979; Lewis 1980). Other papers that do include
both risk aversion and limited liability include, e.g., also Mookherjee and Png (1989), Ozbilgin and Penno
(2008), Penno (2005), Rasmusen (1987).
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following way:
P{ŷ = yL |a = aH }
= P
(
max
{
yi ; i ∈ {1, . . . , N }
}
= yL |a = aH
)
= P
(
y1 = yL , y2 = yL , . . . , yN = yL |a = aH
)
(7)
= P
(
y1 = yL |a = aH
)
P
(
y2 = yL |a = aH
)
· · · P
(
yN = yL |a = aH
)
= pN ,
and,
P{ŷ = yH |a = aH } = 1 − pN . (8)
Similarly, for low effort:
P{ŷ = yH |a = aL} = 1 − q N, (9)
P{ŷ = yL |a = aL} = q N. (10)
For notational convenience, we denote s(yH , N ) = sH (N ) and s(yL , N ) = sL(N ),
for the compensation levels when N measurement methods are available, and in case
signal yH or yL is reported, respectively. Moreover, we let M = − 1ρ ln(−M) denote
the monetary equivalent of the reservation utility M . Then, (3) and (7)–(10) imply that
optimization problem (4) is equivalent to:
min pN · sL(N ) + (1 − pN ) · sH (N )
s.t.
pN · e−ρ(sL (N )−cH ) + (1 − pN ) · e−ρ(sH (N )−cH )
 q N · e−ρ(sL (N )−cL ) + (1 − q N ) · e−ρ(sH (N )−cL )
pN · e−ρ(sL (N )−cH ) + (1 − pN ) · e−ρ(sH (N )−cH )  e−ρM
sL(N )  0, sH (N )  0.
(11)
Our goal is to study the effect of the degree of reporting flexibility N on agency costs.
In the next section we first determine how the principal optimally conditions the con-
tractually committed payments on the degree of reporting flexibility N . This will then
allow us to characterize conditions under which allowing higher degrees of flexibility
is beneficial to the principal.
3 Contract payments conditional on N
The following theorem shows that a minimal degree of reporting discretion may be
necessary in order to be able to write a contract that motivates the agent to perform
high effort. It also shows how the principal optimally conditions the contractually
committed payments in case of a favorable and an unfavorable signal, respectively, on
the degree of reporting flexibility N .
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Theorem 1 A minimal level of reporting flexibility is necessary for the existence of
an optimal contract. Specifically, an optimal compensation contract exists iff
N >
ρ(cH − cL)
ln q − ln p .
Then, the limited liability constraint is binding iff N > N∗, where
N∗ = max
{
N ∈ N : 1 − q
N
1 − pN 
1 − e−ρ(M+cL )
1 − e−ρ(M+cH )
}
. (12)
Moreover:
(i) If N  N∗, the optimal compensation scheme is given by
sL(N ) = − 1
ρ
ln
(1 − pN )e−ρ(M+cL ) − (1 − q N )e−ρ(M+cH )
q N − pN , (13)
sH (N ) = − 1
ρ
ln
q N e−ρ(M+cH ) − pN e−ρ(M+cL )
q N − pN . (14)
(ii) If N > N∗, the optimal compensation scheme is given by
sL(N ) = 0, (15)
sH (N ) = − 1
ρ
ln
q N e−ρ(M+cH ) − pN e−ρ(M+cL )
(1 − pN )e−ρ(M+cL ) − (1 − q N )e−ρ(M+cH ) . (16)
The above theorem shows that a minimal degree of reporting flexibility may be
necessary to be able to resolve incentive conflicts at finite cost. The intuition is as
follows. Providing high effort yields a higher probability of getting the bonus, but also
yields a higher disutility from effort. Delivering high effort can be made more attractive
by increasing the level of the bonus. However, the level of the utility associated with
compensation received in case of a favorable signal cannot be made arbitrarily high by
increasing the size of the bonus (i.e., the utility function has a bliss level). This implies
that when the agency problem is “severe” because an unfavorable signal carries little
information regarding the manager’s action choice, the agent cannot be motivated to
provide high effort. Specifically, if the manager is constrained to using a specific mea-
surement method (i.e., when N = 1), then there does not exist an optimal contract if the
likelihood ratio of an unfavorable signal is low relative to the manager’s risk-adjusted
cost differential, i.e., if qp < e
ρ(cH −cL )
. Allowing more flexibility by increasing the
number of available methods solves this problem, because it makes a low signal more
informative. Indeed, a contract that resolves incentive problems exists if the manager
can choose amongst N > ρ(cH −cL )ln q−ln p performance measurement methods, because then
the likelihood ratio of an unfavorable signal increases to q
N
pN =
(
q
p
)N
> eρ(cH −cL ).
Thus, if a manager cannot be motivated to deliver high effort by increasing the level
of the bonus, increasing the level of reporting discretion may be an alternative means
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Fig. 1 Optimal values of sH (N ) (dashed-dotted) and sL (N ) (dashed) (left panel) and expected cost (right
panel), as a function of N for ρ = 0.1, cL = 0, cH = 5, M = 3, p = 0.3, q = 0.9
to resolve incentive conflicts. If, in contrast, the utility of compensation in case of
a favorable signal can be made arbitrarily high by increasing the level of the bonus,
as is the case for example for the power utility function considered in Ozbilgin and
Penno (2008), then there always exists a level of the bonus that makes it optimal for
the manager to perform high effort.6
Theorem 1 also shows that the way in which the optimal contract is affected by
the level of reporting flexibility depends crucially on whether the threshold value N∗
is exceeded, or, equivalently, whether the limited liability constraint is binding. It is
therefore intuitively clear that this threshold value can also play a dominant role in the
effect of reporting flexibility on the expected cost of compensation.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1. It shows the payoffs sL(N ) and sH (N ) and the expected
cost of the optimal contract, as a function of the number of alternative measurement
methods. We see that the optimal payoffs as well as the expected cost of compensa-
tion first decrease and then increase as N increases. Although in the setting in Fig. 1
the limited liability constraint becomes binding at N∗ = 6, and the expected cost of
compensation decreases (increases) in N for N  6 (N > 6), we will show in the
sequel that this is not the general pattern.
4 The effect of increased reporting flexibility
In this section we determine the effect of an increase in the level of reporting flex-
ibility on the level of compensation and the size of the bonus (Subsect. 4.1), on the
manager’s expected utility (Subsect. 4.2), and on the expected cost of compensation
(Subsect. 4.3).
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
123
368 A. De Waegenaere, J. L. Wielhouwer
4.1 The effect on the optimal contract
For the sake of intuition, we view the compensation package as consisting of a level
of compensation sL(N ), to which a bonus sH (N ) − sL(N ) is added in case of a
high report. We also introduce a second threshold value ˜N , which is defined as
follows:
˜N = ln
(
ln p
ln q
)
+ρ(cH −cL )
ln q−ln p . (17)
In the following theorem we determine the effect of the level of reporting flexibility
(N ) on the two levels of compensation sL(N ) and sH (N ) , as well as on the size of
the bonus (the difference between the two levels of compensation), where the critical
values N∗ and ˜N are as defined in (12) and (17), respectively.
Theorem 2 For the optimal compensation contract, the following holds:
(i) sH (N ) is decreasing in N for N  max{N∗, ˜N }, and increasing in N for N >
max{N∗, ˜N },
(ii) sL(N ) is decreasing in N for N  N∗, and sL(N ) = 0 for N > N∗.
(iii) sH (N )−sL(N ) is decreasing in N for N  ˜N , and increasing in N for N > ˜N.
The above theorem shows that the optimal contract depends crucially on the two
critical values, ˜N and N∗. First, regardless of whether the limited liability constraint
is binding or not, the critical level ˜N determines whether an increase in N makes
incentive problems more severe, or equivalently, whether a higher bonus is required
to motivate high effort. As long as N  ˜N , an increase in the degree of reporting
flexibility makes incentive problems less severe, so that the size of the bonus can be
decreased. The opposite holds when N is higher than the critical level ˜N . The intui-
tion is as follows. The effect of an increase in N on the level of the bonus depends on
whether the increase makes it easier or more difficult to motivate the agent to provide
high effort (i.e., to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint). An increase in N
increases the probability that the bonus is achieved under high effort (i.e., it increases
1 − pN ). However, it also increases the probability that the bonus is achieved when
low effort is provided (i.e., it increases 1−q N ), so that shirking becomes more attrac-
tive. Whether the bonus needs to be increased or can be decreased in response to a
higher degree of reporting discretion depends on which of these two effects is dom-
inant. When N is sufficiently low, an increase in reporting flexibility has a stronger
effect on 1 − pN than on 1 − q N , and vice versa when N is sufficiently high. There-
fore, there exists a threshold value such that a lower (higher) bonus is needed if the
level of discretion is below (above) the threshold value. The threshold value depends
on the severity of the agency problem. If the problem is more “severe” because of
either a high cost differential, or a high degree of risk aversion, then an increase in
the probability of getting the bonus affects the manager’s expected utility under high
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effort more than under low effort. Therefore, the threshold value ˜N is increasing in
ρ(cH − cL).7
Second, the critical level N∗ determines whether the limited liability constraint is
binding. An increase in N increases 1− pN , i.e., there is a higher probability of getting
the bonus. It therefore allows for a lower level of compensation in case of an unfavor-
able signal (sL(N )). This eventually makes the limited liability constraint binding. As
long as the limited liability constraint is not binding (i.e., N  N∗), both levels of com-
pensation can be decreased when reporting flexibility increases. When the lowerbound
on compensation becomes binding (N > N∗), the compensation in case of an unfavor-
able signal needs to be fixed at its minimal level. Consequently, the size of the bonus
can only be affected by changing the level of the compensation in case of a favorable
report. It needs to be increased when N > ˜N , but can be decreased when N  ˜N .
4.2 The effect on the manager’s expected utility
In this section we study the effect of an increase in the degree of reporting flexibility
on the manager’s expected utility. Let us therefore denote C E(N ) for the manager’s
certain equivalent as a function of the number of alternative measurement methods,
N , i.e., C E(N ) is such that
u(C E(N ), aH ) = E [u(s(ŷ, N ), a)| a = aH ]
= (1 − pN ) · u(sH (N ), aH ) + pN · u(sL(N ), aH ), (18)
where sH (N ) and sL(N ) are as defined in Theorem 1. The following theorem deter-
mines the effect of N on the manager’s certain equivalent.
Theorem 3 For the manager’s certain equivalent, the following holds:
C E(N ) = M + cH , for N  N∗,
= 1
ρ
ln
(1 − pN )eρ(cH −cL) − (1 − q N )
q N − pN , for N > N
∗.
The certain equivalent is strictly increasing in N for N > N∗.
The above theorem implies that the manager’s utility is not affected by a change
in the degree of reporting flexibility N as long as the N does not exceed critical level
N∗. The expected utility of the manager is then equal to his reservation utility. Above
the critical level N∗, the manager starts earning a rent due to the fact that the limited
liability constraint becomes binding. Since the rent is increasing in N , the manager
strictly benefits from increased reporting flexibility.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2. It can be verified that the limited liability constraint
becomes binding at N∗ = 4, for cL = 0 and cL = 1, and at N∗ = 6 for cL = 3. Once
7 Because the IC constraint is binding in the optimum (see proof of Theorem 1), the level of the bonus,
sH (N )− sL (N ), follows from: pN + (1− pN )e−ρ(sH (N )−sL (N )) = [q N + (1−q N )e−ρ(sH (N )−sL (N ))]
e−ρ(cH −cL ). It can be verified that dd N (1 − pN ) > dd N (1 − q N ) iff N ≤ ln
(
ln p
ln q
)
/(ln q − ln p) (see
proof of Theorem 2 for α = 1).
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Fig. 2 The manager’s certain equivalent, as a function of N , for p = 0.3, q = 0.7, ρ = 0.1, M = 10,
cH = 7, and cL = 0 (solid line), cL = 1 (dashed line) and cL = 3 (dashed-dotted line)
the limited liability constraint is binding, the agent earns a limited liability rent. The
size of the rent increases when the degree of reporting flexibility increases. The rate
of the increase is increasing in the difference between the cost of high and low effort.
4.3 The effect on the expected cost of compensation
In this section we study the effect of an increase in the degree of reporting flexibility
on the expected cost of compensation, which is given by:
E [ s(ŷ, N )| a = aH ] = (1 − pN ) · sH (N ) + pN · sL(N ), (19)
where sH (N ) and sL(N ) denote the optimal levels of compensation in case N methods
are available, as given in Theorem 1. In particular, we characterize conditions under
which increased reporting flexibility leads to lower (higher) agency costs.
The analysis in the previous subsections hints at the fact that the effect of reporting
flexibility on the expected cost of compensation will be driven by the following three
effects:
– The decreased compensation risk effect: because pN is strictly decreasing in N ,
an increase in the degree of reporting flexibility implies that the manager faces less
compensation risk because the probability that he will receive the bonus increases.
Consequently, the compensation in case of an unfavorable signal can be decreased
(Theorem 2 ii).
– The incentive compatibility effect: the bonus can be decreased when N < ˜N (needs
to be increased when N  ˜N ) because an increase in reporting flexibility then mit-
igates (aggravates) incentive problems (Theorem 2 iii).
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– The limited liability effect: when N  N∗, the limited liability constraint is
binding, and the manager earns a rent which increases in the level of reporting
flexibility (Theorem 3).
In isolation, each of these effects is either cost increasing or cost decreasing, but
the aggregate effect is non-trivial. For example, when N < N∗, the limited liability
constraint is not binding, and the agency cost equals the risk premium. Then, even
when increased flexibility increases the bonus (i.e., when N > N˜ ), the expected cost
of compensation does not necessarily increase because the increase in the probability
that the bonus is received reduces the manager’s compensation risk.
In the sequel we characterize the conditions under which increased reporting flex-
ibility will increase (decrease) the expected cost of compensation. The following
theorem shows that for sufficiently high values of N , the cost increasing effects of the
limited liability rent and increased incentive problems are dominant.
Theorem 4 If N > max{N∗, ˜N } , then the expected cost of compensation is increas-
ing in N.
We now focus on the case where N  max{N∗, ˜N }. The following theorem shows
that whether a higher degree of reporting flexibility would increase or decrease the
expected cost of compensation depends on: the probabilities pN and q N , whether N
exceeds the threshold value N∗,8 and the manager’s personal cost factor α, which is
defined as:
α = e−ρ(cH −cL ). (20)
The parameter α reflects the severity of the agency problem. A lower value of α, e.g.,
due to a higher degree of risk aversion and/or a bigger difference between the cost
of high effort and low effort, ceteris paribus, implies that compensation will be more
costly.
Theorem 5 Let p, q, and N  max{N∗, ˜N } be given, and denote
S = {(u, v) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] : (u − 2uv + v) ln u − 2v(1 − u) ln v > 0} . (21)
Then, there exists an α∗ and an α∗b such that:9
(i) If N < N∗, an increase in N decreases the expected cost of compensation if
α < α∗or (pN , q N ) /∈ S, and increases the expected cost of compensation
otherwise.
(ii) If N∗  N  ˜N, an increase in N decreases (increases) the expected cost of
compensation iff α < α∗b (α > α∗b).
Figure 3 illustrates the set S.
8 Given pN and q N , the number of alternative signals N affects the magnitude of the derivative of the
expected cost of compensation with respect to N , but not its sign.
9 The critical values α∗ and α∗b depend on pN and q N . In order to avoid overloaded notation, we do not
explicitly denote this dependence, unless it is required for clarity.
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Fig. 3 The combinations of pN and q N for which (pN , q N ) ∈ S
Finally, we discuss the effect of the degree of reporting flexibility on the risk pre-
mium, which is given by:
E [ s(ŷ, N )| a = aH ]−C E(N )=(1 − pN ) · sH (N )+ pN · sL(N )−C E(N ), (22)
where sH (N ) and sL(N ) denote the optimal levels of compensation in case N meth-
ods are available, as given in Theorem 1 , and C E(N ) denotes the manager’s certain
equivalent, as given in Theorem 3. The risk premium is equal to the agency cost when
N  N∗, because then the limited liability constraint is not binding, and the agent’s
certain equivalent is equal to M + cH , the compensation cost in absence of an agency
problem. However, when N > N∗, the limited liability constraint is binding and the
agency cost is strictly higher than the risk premium because the agent earns a limited
liability rent. Moreover, whereas the agency cost is affected by the limited liability
constraint when N > N∗ (i.e., the agency cost would be lower in absence of the
limited liability constraint), this is not the case for the risk premium. Both with and
without the liability constraint, the risk premium is equal to the agency cost in absence
of the limited liability constraint. This yields the following result.
Theorem 6 Let S be as defined in Theorem 5. Then, there exists an α∗ such that an
increase in N decreases the risk premium if α < α∗ or (pN , q N ) /∈ S, and increases
the risk premium otherwise.
5 Implications
In this section we use Theorems 3 and 5 to study the implications of increased reporting
flexibility for both the principal and the manager. We will distinguish four ranges of
values of N , depending on whether ˜N < N∗, or vice versa. Note that N∗ is decreasing
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in cH and increasing in cL , and the opposite holds for ˜N . Moreover, N∗ is increasing
in M , and ˜N is independent of M . Therefore, the case ˜N < N∗ is more likely to occur
when the cost differential cH − cL is high, and/or when the reservation utility M is
high.
The case where N  min{N∗, ˜N }.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is not binding (because N  N∗), and an
increase in reporting flexibility mitigates incentive problems and therefore allows for
a lower bonus (because N  ˜N ). Now it can be verified numerically that: 10
N  ˜N ⇒ α < α∗. (23)
It therefore follows from Theorem 5 (i) that the expected cost of compensation will
be decreasing in N . Moreover, since the limited liability constraint is not binding, it
follows from Theorem 3 that the manager does not earn a rent. This yields:
Implication 1: If N is sufficiently low (N  min{N∗, ˜N }), an increase in the degree of
reporting flexibility makes the principal strictly better off, while leaving the manager’s
utility unaffected.
The case where ˜N  N  N∗.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is still not binding (because N  N∗),
but an increase in reporting flexibility now aggravates incentive problems and thus a
higher bonus is required (since ˜N  N ). The effect on the expected cost of compen-
sation therefore depends on whether the cost reducing effect of reduced compensation
risk outweighs the cost increasing effect of increased incentive problems. It follows
from Theorem 5 i) that the aggregate effect of increased reporting flexibility on the
expected cost of compensation depends on both the risk aversion/cost parameter α, as
well as on (pN , q N ). Combined with the result from Theorem 3, this yields:
Implication 2: If ˜N  N  N∗, an increase in the degree of reporting flexibility
leaves the manager’s utility unaffected, and makes the principal better off if α < a∗
or (pN , q N ) /∈ S, and worse off otherwise.
Since S ⊂ [0, 0.2] × [0, 0.2], there is a wide range of parameter values for which
(pN , q N ) /∈ S. We illustrate this in Fig. 4.
For the parameter values in Fig. 4, it holds that ˜N = 2 and N∗ = 26. The criti-
cal value of α needed to make the increased incentive problems effect dominant, α∗,
decreases for N  5, and increases for N > 5. It can be verified that α = 0.99 > α∗
and (pN , q N ) ∈ S for N ∈ [3, 8]. The expected cost of compensation therefore
increases over that range, but decreases outside that range.
The case where N∗  N  ˜N .
In this case, the limited liability constraint is binding (because N  N∗), but the
degree of reporting flexibility is sufficiently low so that an increase in reporting
10 Remember that ˜N depends on α, p, and q, and that α∗ depends on (pN , q N ).
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Fig. 4 Left panel expected cost of compensation in excess of M +cH as a function of N , for cL = 0, cH =
100, M = 85000, p = 0.46, q = 0.52, and α = 0.99. Right panel the critical value α∗ as a function of N
for p = 0.46, q = 0.52
flexibility allows for a lower bonus (because N  ˜N ). It then follows from Theo-
rem 5 (ii) that the cost decreasing effects (decreased risk compensation and decreased
incentive problems) dominate the limited liability effect if the manager is sufficiently
risk averse, i.e. if α < α∗b . Combined with the results of Theorem 3, this yields the
following:
Implication 3: If N∗  N  ˜N and α < α∗b , an increase in the degree of reportingflexibility is strictly beneficial to both the manager and the principal.
We illustrate this result in Fig. 5.
For the parameter values in Fig. 5, it can be verified that N∗ = 2, and ˜N = 26, and
that α = 0.98 < α∗b for all N  5. Combined with Implication 1, this implies that
the expected cost of compensation decreases for N  5, and increases for N > 5.
Interestingly, for values of N between 2 and 5, the expected cost of compensation is
decreasing in N , even though an increase in N strictly increases the manager’s rent.
The case where N  max{N∗, ˜N }.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is binding, and an increase in reporting flex-
ibility would require a higher bonus. We know from Theorem 4 that the combination
of increased incentive problems and limited liability then implies that the expected
cost of compensation will increase when the level of reporting flexibility increases.
Moreover, it follows from Theorem 3 that the manager’s limited liability rent will also
increase.
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Fig. 5 The left panel the expected cost of compensation as a function of N , for p = 0.875, q = 0.995,
ρ = 0.01, cL = 0, cH = 2 and M = 0.094, so that α = 0.98. The right panel α∗b as a function of N , for
p = 0.875 and q = 0.995
Implication 4: If N is sufficiently high (N  max{N∗, ˜N }), an increase in the degree
of reporting flexibility makes the principal strictly worse off, while making the manager
strictly better off.
6 The effect of costly reporting effort
Determining performance signals from multiple measurement methods may require
costly effort on the part of the manager. In this section we investigate the effect of
such flexibility induced reporting costs on the expected cost of compensation, and on
the optimal degree of reporting flexibility.
Flexibility induced reporting costs affect incentive contracting in several ways.
(i) First, in determining the optimal levels of pay conditional on a given degree of
reporting flexibility N , the principal needs to take into account that the degree
of flexibility not only affects the probability distribution of the reported signal,
but also the manager’s disutility for reporting effort.
(ii) Second, when determining performance signals from different methods requires
costly effort, the manager may not always have an incentive to determine all
signals. Specifically, when N methods are allowed, the manager will stop deter-
mining signals as soon as a high signal is found. As long as only low signals
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were found, the manager trades off the increase in the expected utility from
compensation when more signals are determined against the higher disutility
from searching effort. Whether it is beneficial to determine an additional signal
depends on the bonus received in case a high signal is found, the probability that
a high signal is found (which, in turn, depends on the action a that was chosen),
and the incremental cost for determining another signal. We consider the case
where the monetary equivalent of the manager’s disutility associated with deter-
mining the signals corresponding to k  N methods is given by γ (k), where
γ (k) is strictly increasing in k. Because the manager always stops evaluating
signals once a favorable signal is found, his strategy is fully characterized by how
long he continues to search for a favorable signal. We denote n ∈ {1, . . . , N }
for the manager’s choice regarding the number of consecutive low signals after
which he stops determining signals. Moreover, we denote
N∗H (s, N ) and N∗L(s, N ), (24)
for the manager’s optimal choice of n as a function of contract payments s =
(sH , sL) and number of acceptable methods N , given that high or low action was
chosen, respectively. A formal derivation of N∗H (s, N ) and N∗L(s, N ) is given
in Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
(iii) Because the manager stops determining signals when either a high signal is
found, or when the first n methods yielded low signals, the monetary equivalent
of the disutility for effort spent on determining signals, denoted as γ̂ , depends on
the realizations of the signals. The joint probability distribution of the monetary
equivalent of the disutility for reporting effort, γ̂ , and the reported signal, ŷ,
depends on the manager’s reporting choice n, which determines the maximum
number of signals that will be determined, and his action choice a, which deter-
mines the probability that a high signal is found before the maximum number of
signals is determined. First consider the case where the manager chooses high
action and evaluates at most n methods. Then, for any k = 1, . . . , n, it holds that
the manager will evaluate k methods and report a high signal (i.e., γ̂ = γ (k),
and ŷ = yH ) iff the first k − 1 signals are low and the k-th signal is high. This
occurs with probability (1− p)pk−1. He will evaluate k = n methods and report
a low signal (i.e., γ̂ = γ (n), and ŷ = yL ) iff the first n signals are low. This
occurs with probability pn . Thus,
P(γ̂ = γ (k), ŷ = yH |a = aH , n) = (1 − p)pk−1 for k = 1, . . . , n.
P(γ̂ = γ (k), ŷ = yL |a = aH , n) = 0 for k = 1, . . . , n − 1,
= pk, for k = n. (25)
In case of low action, the probability distribution is as in (25) with p replaced
by q.
For any given degree of flexibility N , the principal determines contract payments
sH = s(yH , N ) and sL = s(yL , N ) so as to minimize the expected cost of inducing
the agent to choose action aH , taking into account his self-interested behavior with
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respect to his action and reporting choices. For the latter, the principal needs to take
into account that the contract payments affect the maximum number of signals that the
manager will determine when high (low) action was chosen, i.e., they affect N∗H (s, N )
and N∗L(s, N ). This yields the following optimization problem:
min
s
E
[
s(ŷ, N )| a = aH , n = N∗H (s, N )
]
s.t.
ŷ ∈ arg max
y∈{yi :i=1,...,N∗H (s,N )}
s(y, N ) (IC’)
E
[−e−ρ(s(ŷ,N )−cH −γ̂ )∣∣ a = aH , n = N∗H (s, N )
]
 M (IR)
E
[−e−ρ(s(ŷ,N )−cH −γ̂ )∣∣ a = aH , n = N∗H (s, N )
]
 E
[−e−ρ(s(ŷ,N )−cL−γ̂ ))∣∣ a = aL , n = N∗L(s, N )
] (IC)
s(yH , N ), s(yL , N )  0. (LL)
(26)
The (IC’) constraint reflects the manager’s self-interested behavior with respect to his
reporting strategy, i.e., he will report the best signal out of maximum N∗H (s, N ) signals,
where N∗H (s, N ) depends on the contractually agreed payments (s(yH , N ), s(yL , N )).
The (IC) and (IR) constraints reflect the fact that accepting the contract and choos-
ing high action must be optimal, taking into account that the action choice affects the
probability distribution of both the the disutility for reporting effort γ̂ , and the reported
signal ŷ.
The following theorem shows that if reporting costs are not too high, it is optimal
for the principal to offer a contract that provides the manager with the incentive to
keep searching for a favorable signal ultimately until all N acceptable methods are
used.
Theorem 7 The optimal contract satisfies N∗H (s, N ) = N∗L(s, N ) = N if
max
k∈{1,...,N−1}
{
eρ(γ (k+1)−γ (k))
}
 1
(1 − q) · e−ρ·B(i, j) + q , for all i, j  N , (27)
where B(i, j) denotes the the minimal required bonus to motivate the manager to
choose high action, given that n¯ = i if a = aH and n¯ = j if a = aL .
If condition (27) is satisfied, there does not exist a contract that satisfies the follow-
ing two conditions. First, it motivates the manager to choose high action. Second, for
at least one action choice it holds that once effort has been delivered and performance
signals have been realized, the contract motivates the manager to stop searching for
a favorable signal before all allowed methods are investigated (i.e., N∗H (s, N ) < N
and/or N∗L(s, N ) < N ). The reason that such a contract does not exist if condition
(27) is satisfied is that while the bonus offered in case of a favorable signal needs
to be sufficiently high to motivate the agent to deliver high action, the bonus needs
to be sufficiently low to provide incentives to stop searching for a favorable signal
before all acceptable methods have been used. Condition (27) implies that whenever
the bonus is sufficiently high to motivate high action, it will also induce the manager
to keep searching for a favorable signal ultimately until all methods have been used.
Consequently, any contract that motivates the agent to deliver high action necessarily
satisfies N∗H (s, N ) = N and N∗L(s, N ) = N .
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Fig. 6 Expected cost of compensation as a function of N for ρ = 0.1, cL = 0, cH = 5, M = 3, p = 0.6,
q = 0.9, and for c = 0 (solid line), and c = cH /80 (dashed line), respectively
In the remainder of this section we show that flexibility induced costly reporting
effort may make higher degrees of flexibility, i.e., a higher value of N , more attractive
for the principal. Moreover, for sufficiently large degrees of reporting flexibility, the
expected cost of compensation with costly reporting effort can be strictly less than the
expected cost of compensation with costless reporting effort. Compared to the case
where reporting effort is costless, the level of compensation may need to be increased
for the effort-averse manager to (weakly) prefer the contract to his best outside option.
However, when the contract induces the manager to engage in more costly reporting
effort when low action was chosen than when high action was chosen, reporting costs
make it easier to motivate the manager to choose high action, so that a lower bonus
is needed. This suggests that higher degrees of flexibility can be more attractive when
reporting induces costly effort than when reporting effort is costless. This is illustrated
in Fig. 6.
Figure 6 displays the expected cost of compensation as a function of the number
of acceptable measurement methods N over the range N ∈ [2, 9], for the case where
determining signals is costless, i.e., γ (k) = 0, for all k  N (solid line), and for the
case where it induces costly reporting effort. In the latter case, the manager’s monetary
equivalent of the disutility associated with determining signals increases linearly in the
number of signals that are determined, i.e., γ (k) = ck, with c = cH /80 (dashed line).
Both with costless and with costly reporting effort, a minimum of two methods is
needed for an optimal contract to exist, but allowing more reporting flexibility is opti-
mal for the principal; the expected cost of compensation decreases significantly as N
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Fig. 7 The limited liability rent (left panel) and the bonus (right panel) as a function of N for ρ = 0.1,
cL = 0, cH = 5, M = 3, p = 0.6, q = 0.9, and for c = 0 (solid line), and c = cH /80 (dashed line),
respectively
increases from N = 2 to N = 5. However, the optimal degree of reporting flexibility
when reporting is costly is higher than when it is costless. Indeed, whereas it is optimal
for the principal to allow the manager to choose out of maximum N = 5 methods in
case reporting is costless, the optimal level of reporting flexibility increases to N = 6
when it is costly. Moreover, for any N > 5, the expected cost of compensation with
costly reporting effort is strictly lower than the expected cost of compensation with
costless reporting effort. This can be explained by the following two reasons.
First, it can be verified that for all N , condition (27) is satisfied. Thus, regardless
of whether high or low action was chosen, the manager will continue to evaluate
signals until either a favorable signal is found, or all N methods were used. The
probability of finding a favorable performance signal, however, is higher when high
action was chosen than when low action was chosen. Therefore, the manager will,
in expectation, engage in more costly reporting effort in an attempt to increase his
compensation when low action was chosen. This implies that high action becomes
relatively more attractive when reporting requires costly effort, so that a lower bonus
suffices to motivate the manager to choose high action. This is illustrated in the right
panel in Fig. 7.
Second, the analysis in the previous sections shows that the effect of reporting flex-
ibility on the expected cost of compensation depends also crucially on how it affects
the manager’s limited liability rent. When the degree of reporting flexibility is suffi-
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ciently high (i.e., when N > N∗ = 5), the manager would earn a limited liability rent
when reporting effort would be costless. In contrast, when determining performance
signals induces costly effort, the increase in the level of pay needed to compensate
the effort-averse manager for this effort implies that the limited liability constraint is
only binding when N > 6. Moreover, for any N > 5, costly reporting effort strictly
reduces the manager’s limited liability rent. This is illustrated in the left panel in Fig. 7.
Thus, a higher degree of reporting flexibility is more attractive when reporting effort
is costly than when it is costless, because the higher level of pay needed to compensate
the manager for the disutility associated with reporting effort is fully outweighed by
the decrease in both the bonus and the limited liability rent.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of the degree of reporting flexibility on agency costs in
settings where the principal delegates measurement method choice to the agent.
First, we show that a minimal degree of reporting flexibility may be necessary to
be able to resolve incentive conflicts at finite cost. If the principal faces a hard agency
problem because an unfavorable signal carries little information regarding the man-
ager’s action choice and because the level of utility that the manager derives from
compensation cannot be made arbitrarily high by increasing the level of the bonus
in case of a favorable signal, it is impossible to design a contract that motivates the
manager to deliver high effort. Increasing the degree of reporting flexibility increases
the informativeness of an unfavorable signal. Therefore, if a manager cannot be moti-
vated to deliver high effort by increasing the level of the bonus, increasing the level
of reporting discretion may be an alternative means to resolve incentive conflicts.
Second, we identify the three main effects of an increase in the level of reporting
flexibility on managerial compensation in a setting where the manager has the discre-
tion to choose the method. First, it reduces the manager’s risk because the probability
that he will be able to report a favorable signal increases. Second, the size of the bonus
required to motivate the manager to provide high effort can be decreased if the current
level of discretion is sufficiently low, but the opposite would happen if that level is
relatively high. Finally, the fact that the manager faces limited liability significantly
affects the effect of increased reporting flexibility. The limited liability constraint will
be binding if the degree of reporting flexibility is, or becomes, sufficiently high. We
characterize the conditions under which the aggregate of these three effects will lead
to a higher or lower cost of compensation. We find that for a broad set of parameter
values, increased reporting flexibility would be strictly beneficial to the principal and
would leave the manager’s utility unaffected. We also identify conditions under which
both the principal and the manager are strictly better off when more performance
measurement alternatives are available.
Finally, we investigate the effect of costly reporting effort on the expected com-
pensation cost. We find that, compared to the case where reporting effort is costless,
offering more reporting flexibility may be more attractive. Moreover, for high degrees
of flexibility, the expected cost of compensation can be strictly lower when report-
ing effort is costly than when it is costless. This occurs for two reasons. First, when
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search costs are not too high, the manager has an incentive to continue to evaluate
performance signals until either a favorable signal is found or all acceptable methods
were used. Because the probability of finding a favorable performance signal is higher
when high action was chosen than when low action was chosen, the manager will,
in expectation, engage in more costly reporting effort when low action was chosen.
Thus, costs associated with determining performance signals make the low action
choice relatively less attractive, so that a lower bonus suffices to motivate the agent
to choose high action. Second, when the degree of reporting flexibility is sufficiently
high, compensation for costly reporting effort may lead to a reduction in the limited
liability rent. The combination of these two effects implies that higher degrees of flex-
ibility can be more attractive with costly reporting effort than with costless reporting
effort.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Remarks 1. Note that if a real-valued function f (·) is increasing (decreasing) over
the range [l, b], then f (·) is clearly also increasing (decreasing) over all inte-
ger values in that range. Therefore, although N can only take integer values, we
can conclude that f (N ) is increasing (decreasing) in N over a certain range if
f ′(·) > 0 (< 0) over that range.
2. The following properties will be used throughout the proofs:
d
dn (x
n) = xn ln(x), for all x > 0,
ln(x) < 0, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
ln(x)  x − 1, for all x > 0,
ln(xn) = n ln(x), for all x > 0 and n ∈ N,
ln(xy) = ln(x) + ln(y), for all x > 0, y > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 (i) Let us first consider the optimization problem without the
limited liability constraints. Then it follows immediately from the KKT-conditions
that the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraint are both bind-
ing.
It can be verified that the solution equals sL(N ) = − 1ρ ln(x∗) and sH (N ) =
− 1
ρ
ln(y∗), where
x∗ = (1 − p
N )e−ρ(M+cL ) − (1 − q N )e−ρ(M+cH )
q N − pN , (28)
y∗ = q
N e−ρ(M+cH ) − pN e−ρ(M+cL )
q N − pN . (29)
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The resulting payment scheme is feasible (i.e., 0  sL < ∞, 0  sH < ∞) iff
0 < x∗  1 and 0 < y∗  1. If x∗  0 or y∗  0, then an optimal compensation
scheme does not exist. If x∗ > 1 or y∗ > 1 , then the limited liability constraint is
violated.
Note that y∗  x∗ and
y∗ > 0 ⇐⇒
(
q
p
)N
> eρ(cH −cL ),
so that indeed an optimum exists iff N > ρ(cH −cL )ln q−ln p .
Furthermore, the limited liability constraint is binding iff
x∗ > 1 ⇐⇒ 1 − q
N
1 − pN >
1 − e−ρ(M+cL )
1 − e−ρ(M+cH ) . (30)
Now it remains to show that
N > N∗ ⇐⇒ 1 − q
N
1 − pN >
1 − e−ρ(M+cL )
1 − e−ρ(M+cH ) .
Given the definition of N∗, it is sufficient to show that 1−q
N
1−pN is increasing in N .
d
d N
(
1 − q N
1 − pN
)
= p
N ln p(1 − q N ) − q N ln q(1 − pN )
(1 − pN )2
= 1 − q
N
1 − pN
(
pN
1 − pN ln p −
q N
1 − q N ln q
)
.
Now, let us introduce the function
g(x) = x ln x
1 − x . (31)
Then
g′(x) = (ln x + 1)(1 − x) + x ln x
(1 − x)2 ,
= ln x − x ln x + 1 − x + x ln x
(1 − x)2 ,
= ln x + 1 − x
(1 − x)2  0.
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The last inequality follows from the fact that ln x  x − 1. Therefore,
d
d N
(
1 − q N
1 − pN
)
= 1 − q
N
1 − pN
(
g(pN ) − g(q N )
)
· 1
N
,
 0.
Moreover,
(
1 − q N
1 − pN
)
N=1
= 1 − q
1 − p < 1,
and
lim
N→∞
1 − q N
1 − pN = 1.
Therefore,
1 − q N
1 − pN 
1 − e−ρ(M+cL )
1 − e−ρ(M+cH ) ⇔ N  N
∗
.
(ii) It follows from the proof of (i) that
1 − q N
1 − pN >
1 − e−ρ(M+cL )
1 − e−ρ(M+cH )
implies that x∗ > 1, so that the limited liability constraint sL(N )  0 is binding. It
then follows that the optimal compensation under yH satisfies
sH (N ) = min − 1
ρ
ln(y)
s.t. eρcH [pN x + (1 − pN )y]  eρcL [q N x + (1 − q N )y]
eρcH [pN x + (1 − pN )y]  e−ρM
0 < y  1
x = 1
(32)
It can be verified that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding,11 and
sH (N ) = − 1
ρ
ln(y∗c ),
11 Let y∗c denote the optimum of (32), and let x∗ and y∗ be as given in (28) and (29). It can be verified
that the IC constraint is equivalent to y ≤ y∗/x∗, and that the IR constraint is equivalent to y ≤ y∗r =
(e−ρ(M+cH ) − pN )/(1 − pN ). In the optimum, at least one constraint is binding, because otherwise y
can be increased. Therefore, y∗c = min{y∗/x∗, y∗r }. By construction, x∗ and y∗ satisfy both the IC and the
IR constraint in equality, and x∗ > 1. This implies that for (x, y) = (x∗/x∗, y∗/x∗), the IC constraint is
binding and the IR constraint is slack, which implies that y∗c = y∗/x∗ ≤ y∗r .
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where
y∗c =
q N e−ρ(M+cH ) − pN e−ρ(M+cL )
(
1 − pN ) e−ρ(M+cL ) − (1 − q N ) e−ρ(M+cH ) . (33)
Proof of Theorem 2 Let us introduce the following notation:
x˜ = q
N α − pN + (1 − α)
q N − pN ,
y˜ = q
N α − pN
q N − pN ,
y˜c = q
N α − pN
q N α − pN + (1 − α) .
Then, for N  N∗,
sL(N ) = M + cL − 1
ρ
ln (˜x),
sH (N ) = M + cL − 1
ρ
ln (y˜),
and for N > N∗
sH (N ) = − 1
ρ
ln (y˜c).
Moreover, for all N ,
sH (N ) − sL(N ) = − 1
ρ
ln y˜c.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that: i) x˜ is increasing in N , ii) y˜ is increasing in
N , and iii) y˜c is increasing in N for N  ˜N , and decreasing in N for N > ˜N .
(i)
dx˜
d N
=
(
q N · ln q · α − pN · ln p) ∗ (q N − pN )
(q N − pN )2
−
(
q N · ln q − pN · ln p) ∗ (q N α − pN )
(q N − pN )2 ,
= 1 − α
(q N − pN )2 · (ln p · p
N (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN )).
Therefore,
dx˜
d N
= (1 − α)(1 − p
N )(1 − q N )
N (q N − pN )2
(
g(pN ) − g(q N )
)
 0, (34)
where the function g(·) is as defined in (31).
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(ii) Since
y˜ = x˜ − 1 − α
q N − pN ,
it follows that
d y˜
d N
= dx˜
d N
− (1 − α) d
d N
(
1
q N − pN
)
,
= (1 − α)
(
q N − pN )2
[
ln p · pN (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN ) − ln p · pN
+ ln q · q N
]
,
= (1 − α)
(
q N − pN )2
pN q N [ln q − ln p] , (35)
 0.
(iii) It can be verified that
dy∗c
d N
= (1 − α) · αq
N ln q − pN ln p
(αq N − pN + 1 − α)2 , (36)
which is negative iff
ln q
ln p
(
q
p
)N
 1
α
⇐⇒ N  ˜N .
Proof of Theorem 3 Let us denote s˜L(N ) and s˜H (N ) for the optimal compensation
scheme when there is no limited liability constraint. Then it follows immediately from
the proof of Theorem 1 that s˜L(N ) and s˜H (N ) are given by (13) and (14), respectively,
for all N . Moreover,
sL(N ) = s˜L(N ), sH (N ) = s˜H (N ), if N  N∗,
sL(N ) = s˜L(N ) − s˜L(N ) = 0, sH (N ) = s˜H (N ) − s˜L(N ), if N > N∗.
(37)
i.e., as a consequence of the limited liability constraint, the compensation increases
with the amount −˜sL(N ).
As can be seen from the proof of Theorem 1, the individual rationality constraint is
binding when N < N∗. Given (37), this implies that the manager’s certain equivalent
is given by:
C E(N ) = M + cH , if N  N∗,
= M + cH − s˜L(N ), if N > N∗.
(38)
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The limited liability rent, C E(N ) − (M + cH ), is zero when N  N∗, and equals
−˜sL(N ) when N > N∗. It follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that −˜sL(N ) is strictly
increasing in N .
Proof of Theorem 4 Suppose that N > max{N∗, ˜N }. Then, we know that sL(N ) = 0
and sH (N ) is increasing in N . Moreover, since sL(N ) = 0, the expected cost equals
(1 − pN ) · sH (N ).
The fact that 1 − pN is increasing in N completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 5 First consider the case where N  N∗. Then the derivative with
respect to N of the expected cost equals
D (α) = −pN ln p(sH (N ) − sL(N )) + (1 − pN ) dd N sH (N ) + p
N d
d N
sL(N ).
It follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that
d
d N
sL(N ) = − 1
ρ
1 − α
(
q N − pN )
ln p · pN (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN )
(1 − pN ) − (1 − q N )α ,
d
d N
sH (N ) = − 1
ρ
1 − α
(
q N − pN )
pN q N (ln q − ln p)
q N α − pN .
Some straightforward but tedious computations show that
D (α) = p
N
ρ
G
(
q N α − pN
1 − α
)
,
where
G (z) = 1
z2 + z ·
ln p · pN (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN )
q N − pN
+ ln p
(
1
z
− ln
(
1 + 1
z
))
.
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Our goal is to determine the sign of D(α). Now, first notice that
lim
z→0 G (z) = limz→0
1
z
⎛
⎝
1
1 + z
(
ln p · pN (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN ))
(
q N − pN ) + ln p
− ln p
ln
(
1 + 1z
)
1
z
⎞
⎠ ,
= (ln p − ln q)q
N (1 − pN )
q N − pN limz→0
1
z
,
= −∞. (39)
lim
z→∞ G (z) = 0. (40)
For ease of notation, we define
c1 = ln p · p
N (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN )
q N − pN > 0,
c2 = − ln p > 0,
f (z) = 1
z + z2 ,
g (z) = 1
z
− ln
(
1 + 1
z
)
.
Then
G (z) = c1 f (z) − c2g (z) .
It can easily be verified that
f ′ (z) = − 1 + 2z
z2 (1 + z)2 ,
g
′
(z) = − 1
z2 (1 + z) .
Consequently,
G
′
(z) = 1
z2 (1 + z)2 ((c2 − 2c1) z + c2 − c1).
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Now, notice that
c1 − c2 = 1q N − pN ·
(
ln p · pN
(
1 − q N
)
− ln q · q N
(
1 − pN
)
+ ln p
(
q N − pN
))
,
= 1
q N − pN (ln p − ln q) · q
N
(
1 − pN
)
< 0.
Now, we consider the following two situations:
– 2c1  c2
Then since c1 − c2 < 0, it follows that G ′(z) > 0 for all z. Combined with (39)
and (40) this implies that G(z)  0 for all z.
– 2c1 > c2
Then, since c1 − c2 < 0 and 2c1 − c2 > 0 we know that G ′(z) has exactly one
strictly positive root. Therefore, G ′(z)  0 for z  z˜ and G ′(z) < 0 for z > z˜,
where z˜ denotes the unique positive root of G ′(z). Again, combined with (39)
and (40), this implies that G(z) has a unique positive root z∗. This implies that
D(α)  0 for α  α∗, and D(α) > 0 for α > α∗ where
α∗ = z
∗ + pN
z∗ + q N .
It now only remains to see that, since ln p = ln pNN and ln q = ln q
N
N , it follows that
(pN , q N ) ∈ S iff 2c1 > c2.
Now, consider the case where N > N∗. Then, given (37), it follows that the deriv-
ative with respect to N of the expected cost equals
Db(α)=−pN ln p(sH (N ) − sL(N ))+(1 − pN ) dd N sH (N )+(p
N − 1) d
d N
sL(N ),
where sH (N ) and sL(N ) are as defined in (14) and (13), respectively.
Therefore,
Db(α) = 1
ρ
Gb
(
q N α − pN
1 − α
)
,
where
Gb(z) =
(
pN
1
z2 + z +
1
1 + z
)
∗ ln p · p
N (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN )
q N − pN
+pN ln p
(
1
z
− ln
(
1 + 1
z
))
.
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Again,
lim
z→0 Gb(z) = −∞ (41)
lim
z→∞ Gb(z) = 0. (42)
It can easily be verified that
G
′
b(z) =
1
z2(1 + z)2
(
− c1
pN
z2 + (c2 − 2c1) z + c2 − c1
)
where
c1 = pN ln p · p
N (1 − q N ) − ln q · q N (1 − pN )
q N − pN > 0
c2 = −pN ln p > 0.
Since G ′b(0) = +∞ and − c1pN < 0, if follows that G
′
b(z) has exactly one strictly
positive root. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6 Let us denote s˜L(N ) and s˜H (N ) for the optimal compensation
scheme when there is no limited liability constraint. Then it follows immediately from
the proof of Theorem 1 that s˜L(N ) and s˜H (N ) are given by (13) and (14), respectively,
for all N .
It follows from (37), and (38) that for all N , the risk premium is given by:
r p(N ) = pN · sL(N ) + (1 − pN ) · sH (N ) − C E(N )
= pN · s˜L(N ) + (1 − pN ) · s˜H (N ) − (M + cH ).
The result now follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 5 for the case where
N  N∗.
In order to be able to prove Theorem 7 , we first formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For any given contract payments s = (sL , sH ) and number of acceptable
methods N, the manager’s optimal strategy when high action was chosen is to stop
determining signals as soon as either a high signal is found, or N∗H (s, N ) methods
have been evaluated, where:
N∗H (s, N ) = min{k : V (k) = u˜(sL , cH + γ (k))}, (43)
where V (k) is determined recursively from:
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V (k) = u˜(sL , cH + γ (k)), for k = N ,
= max
{
u˜(sL , cH + γ (k)),
(1− p) · u˜(sH , cH +γ (k + 1))+ p · V (k+1)
}
, for k = N −1, . . . , 1.
(44)
and u˜(x, c) = −e−ρ(x−c) for all x, c ∈ R.
The manager’s optimal reporting strategy when low action was chosen is to stop
determining signals as soon as either a high signal is found, or N∗L(s, N ) methods
have been evaluated, where N∗L(s, N ) follows from (43) and (44) with p replaced by
q, and cH by cL .
Proof of lemma 1 First consider the case where a = aH . Let V (k) denote the maximal
expected utility from compensation, net of the disutility for effort, given that the first
k signals were low. To decide whether one more signal is determined, the manager
compares the utility in case he stops, i.e., u˜(sL , cH +γ (k)), with the maximal expected
utility in case he determines at least one more signal. Determining one more signal
implies that with probability 1 − p, a high signal is found. The manager’s utility is
then u˜(sH , cH + γ (k + 1)), and it is optimal to stop searching. With probability p, a
low signal is found, and the optimal expected utility is given by V (k + 1). Thus, the
optimal expected utility in case one more signal is determined equals:
(1 − p) · u˜(sH , cH + γ (k + 1)) + p · V (k + 1).
It is optimal to stop verifying signals as soon as
u˜(sL , cH + γ (k))  (1 − p) · u˜(sH , cH + γ (k + 1)) + p · V (k + 1).
This implies that:
N∗H (s, N ) = min{k : V (k) = u˜(sL , cH + γ (k))}.
The proof for a = aL is similar.
Proof of Theorem 7 We first show that N∗H (s, N ) and N∗H (s, N ) are increasing in
sH − sL . Consider the case where a = aH . Let us denote V (sL , sH , k) for the value
function defined in Lemma 1, as a function of the contract payments sL and sH . It is
verified easily that
V (sL , sH , k) = e−ρsL · V (0, sH − sL , k),
and that V (0, sH − sL , k) is increasing in sH − sL . Moreover, stopping is optimal iff
u˜(0, cH + γ (k))  (1 − p) · u˜(sH −sL , cH +γ (k + 1))+ p · V (0, sH − sL , k + 1),
Because both u˜(sH − sL , cH + γ (k + 1)) and V (0, sH − sL , k + 1) are increasing in
sH − sL , this implies that N∗H (s, N ) is increasing in sH − sL . The proof for a = aL
is similar.
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Next, we determine a sufficient condition for N∗H (s, N ) = N and N∗H (s, N ) = N .
First consider a = aH . Because V (k)  u˜(sL , cH + γ (k)), a sufficient condition for
N∗H (s, N ) = N is:
u˜(sL , cH + γ (k))  (1 − p) · u˜(sH , cH + γ (k + 1)) + p · u˜(sL , cH + γ (k + 1)),
for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1, or, equivalently,
e−ρ(sL−cH −γ (k))  (1 − p) · e−ρ(sH −cH −γ (k+1)) + p · e−ρ(sL−cH −γ (k+1)).
This is equivalent to
max
k∈{1,...,N−1}
{
eρ(γ (k+1)−γ (k))
}
 1
(1 − p) · e−ρ(sH −sL ) + p . (45)
Likewise, a sufficient condition for N∗L(s, N ) = N is
max
k∈{1,...,N−1}
{
eρ(γ (k+1)−γ (k))
}
 1
(1 − q) · e−ρ(sH −sL ) + q . (46)
Now take any (i, j) with i < N and/or j < N . We will show that (27) implies
that there does not exist a contract that induces the manager to deliver high effort, and
that satisfies N∗H (s, N ) = i and N∗L(s, N ) = j . Suppose such a contract does exist.
Let B(i, j) denote the minimum level of the bonus needed to motivate the manager to
deliver high effort, given that he chooses n = i if a = aH , and n = j if a = aL . Then,
a contract that induces the manager to deliver high effort and to choose N∗H (s, N ) = i
and N∗L(s, N ) = j needs to satisfy sH − sL  B(i, j).
Now suppose (27) is satisfied. Then,
max
k∈{1,...,N−1}
{
eρ(γ (k+1)−γ (k))
}
 1
(1 − q) · e−ρ·B(i, j) + q
 1
(1 − q) · e−ρ(sH −sL ) + q
 1
(1 − p) · e−ρ(sH −sL ) + p .
Therefore, (45) and (46) are satisfied, and it follows that N∗H (s, N ) = N∗L(s, N ) =
N , i.e., the manager has an incentive to determine all N signals. This contradicts
N∗H (s, N ) = i and N∗L(s, N ) = j . Thus, for any (i, j) with i < N and/or j < N ,
the agent cannot be motivated to deliver high effort and choose n = i if a = aH , and
n = j if a = aL , and so the optimal contract must satisfy N∗H (s, N ) = N∗L(s, N ) = N .
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